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A B S T R A C T
Assertions are speech acts by means of which we express beliefs. As such they are at the heart of our linguistic
and social practices. Recent research has focused extensively on the question whether the speech act of assertion
is governed by norms, and if so, under what conditions it is acceptable to make an assertion. Standard theories
propose, for instance, that one should only assert that p if one knows that p (the knowledge account), or that one
should only assert that p if p is true (the truth account). In a series of four experiments, this question is addressed
empirically. Contrary to previous ﬁndings, knowledge turns out to be a poor predictor of assertability, and the
norm of assertion is not factive either. The studies here presented provide empirical evidence in favour of the
view that a speaker is warranted to assert that p only if her belief that p is justiﬁed.
1. Norms of assertion
Linguistic communication occupies a central place in human life,
and most human practices heavily rely on it. In uttering a string of
meaningful words, we can pursue diﬀerent goals: Ask a question, give
an order, make a request. Most of our utterances, however, are asser-
tions, that is, roughly, utterances by means of which we express beliefs
(Williamson, 2002: 74). A question that has received a lot of attention
in philosophy of language and linguistics recently regards the condi-
tions under which we are warranted to make assertions.
Inquiries of this sort frequently (though not necessarily) presuppose
that (i) assertions of diﬀerent sorts form a uniﬁed type of linguistic
move or speech act, and (ii) that ‘the speech act [of assertion], like a
game and unlike the act of jumping, is constituted by rules.’
(Williamson, 1996: 489). Roughly, the presumption is that just as the
rules of a particular game constitutively deﬁne the game and enable us to
play it, the rules of assertion deﬁne and sustain the social practice of
assertion. What kinds of rules? Four proposals dominate the literature
(for recent reviews, cf. e.g. Goldberg, 2015; Pagin, 2016; Weiner,
2007):
Belief: Assert that p only if you believe that p. (Bach, 2008; Bach &
Harnish, 1979)
Justiﬁed belief: Assert that p only if you justiﬁedly believe that p.
(Douven, 2006; Lackey, 2007)
Truth: Assert that p only if p is true. (Weiner, 2005; cf. also Dummett,
1959)
Knowledge: Assert that p only if you know that p. (Adler, 2002;
Benton, 2011; Brandom, 1998; DeRose, 1996, 2002; Hawthorne,
2003; Turri, 2011; Williamson, 1996, 2002; for early accounts, cf.
Black, 1952; Searle, 1976; Unger, 1975)
The requirements which the above accounts1 impose on the speaker
diﬀer considerably. Whereas on the last two views, the norm of asser-
tion is factive, on the ﬁrst two accounts it is acceptable to make an
assertion that p even if p is false. Besides the debate regarding which of
the above rules is the most promising contender for a norm of assertion,
another dispute concerns the appropriate degree of normative force of
the rule.2 It makes a big diﬀerence whether the norm stipulates that one
‘must’ (Williamson, 2002), ‘should’ (Douven, 2006; Turri, 2013), ‘may’
(Turri, 2014) or ‘is in a position to’ (Dummett, 1959) assert that p only
if p is known (or true, or believed with justiﬁcation).3
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1 A further, increasingly inﬂuential type of account has been proposed by MacFarlane (2011, 2014), according to which assertion is characterized inter alia by a commitment to retract
claims that turn out false at a later context of assessment. However, Kneer (2015, in prep.) reports results that challenge its empirical adequacy.
2 This issue dovetails with the controversial distinction between norms of primary propriety (formulated in terms of strict requirements) and secondary propriety (what would be
reasonable or permissible in light of the norm). Advocates of the distinction include DeRose (2002), Adler (2002), Hindriks (2007), Bach (2008). Scholars such as Engel (2005), Lackey
(2007), Kvanvig (2011) reject the distinction.
3 Following Turri, one can draw a further distinction between simple and non-simple accounts of the norm of assertion. The former are, inter alia, ‘singular because they say there is
exactly one norm of assertion,’ and the relevant norm invoked is ‘perfect because it imposes a perfect duty, one that applies strictly to each and every assertion.’ (2014: 558). While the
accounts in the philosophical literature are predominantly ‘simple’, certain scholars defend ‘non-simple’ views. In contrast to most other advocates of the knowledge account, Turri
himself, for instance, conceives of knowledge neither as a necessary condition for assertability nor as the unique norm of assertion (2016: 62–65). In this brief paper, we will principally be
concerned with ‘simple’ accounts.
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Which of the above norms, if any, deﬁnes the speech act of assertion
is principally a matter of empirical inquiry, an inquiry, that is to say,
which ‘must face the linguistic data’ (Douven, 2006: 450, cf. also Turri,
2013 and Pagin, 2016). Most of the existing evidence to date speaks in
favour of the knowledge account, on which there has been increasing
convergence over the last decade.
2. The knowledge account
A number of ordinary language observations support the knowledge
account. An utterance of the sort ‘p, though I don’t know that p’, for
instance, sounds infelicitous. Likewise, the fact that the question ‘How
do you know?’ is a standard rejoinder to assertions is considered in-
structive: It suggests a widely-held presupposition according to which a
speaker asserting that p is expected to know that p. Perhaps the most
persuasive evidence in favour of the knowledge account, however,
comes from experiments conducted by John Turri and colleagues. Turri
(2013) reports data consistent with the factivity of the norm of asser-
tion (a necessary condition of the knowledge account) and Turri (2015)
explores the knowledge criterion directly. In one experiment, partici-
pants read a vignette in which the protagonist, Mallory, is asked whe-
ther avocados contain vitamin K. In a condition in which Mallory
knows, mean agreement with the claim that he should assert that
avocados contain vitamin K is high; when Mallory doesn’t know, mean
agreement is low. The results are robust across diﬀerent scenarios and
designs. In yet another study (Turri, Friedman, & Keefner, 2017),
knowledge of p proves a better predictor of p’s assertability than belief,
truth or certainty of p.
The evidence reported by Turri and colleagues suggests that, among
the four alternatives surveyed in Section 1, knowledge fares best.
However, two important worries persist. First, in all of Turri’s experi-
ments the assertability question is framed in terms of whether the
protagonist should say that p. But it might be more apt to characterize
the norm of assertion in terms of p’s being a permissible, appropriate or,
more colloquially, an okay thing to say. The fact that p should be done
entails that it is permissible or appropriate to do it, but the reverse
relation does not hold. If one should wear a suit to the wedding, it must
be permitted or appropriate to do so; if it’s permissible to wear jeans it
doesn’t mean one should. An empirical inquiry into norms of assertion
must thus be carefully framed: Which expression is used has important
consequences for the normative force at stake, and hence for the type of
norm that is supposed to govern assertion.4
A second worry regards certain tricky cases that stood epistemology
on its head in the early 1960s. Traditionally, knowledge was deﬁned as
true, justiﬁed belief. However, since the publication of Gettier’s ‘Is
justiﬁed true belief knowledge?’ (1963), it is widely believed that there
are cases that satisfy all three conditions in which we are nonetheless
loath to ascribe knowledge. Consider the following example by
Goldman (1976): Henry takes his young son for a ride through the
countryside and points out objects that come into view. “That’s a cow,”
“That’s a tractor,” “That’s a barn” he says. The scene takes place in
broad daylight, the barn is fully in view, Henry has excellent eyesight
and he is focused on the task, as there is little traﬃc. Henry’s belief that
there’s a barn has good evidential support and thus seems well justiﬁed,
and let’s presume it’s also true: the object in view is in fact a barn. But
unbeknownst to Henry, the area will be used as a ﬁlm-set the next day.
The ﬁelds are full of papier-mâché facsimiles of barn façades, which
look indistinguishable from real barns from the road. Henry happens to
have pointed to the only real barn in the area. Would we call his mental
state a state of knowledge? Presumably not. And yet, it seems perfectly
acceptable for Henry to assert that the designated object is a barn.
Diﬀerently put, and as various scholars have suggested, in Gettier cases
such as the one described, assertability seems warranted despite the fact
that the speaker does not have knowledge (Coﬀman, 2014; Lackey,
2007; Smithies, 2012).
Turri (2016) reports several experiments with Gettier cases which,
once again, conﬁrm the knowledge account. Their design, however, is
perhaps not ideal. In between-subjects experiments, participants were
assigned either an uncontroversial knowledge condition or an acci-
dentally true, yet justiﬁed, belief condition. They had to choose among
the following four options: The agent (i) knew that p and should assert
that p, (ii) knew that p and should not assert that p, (iii) did not know
that p yet should assert that p, or (iv) did not know that p and should not
assert that p. But this bundling of choices is controversial in pragmatic
terms. Facing a Gettier vignette, it might seem unpalatable to respond
that the agent should say that p though she didn’t know that p, because
there is a strong implicature that the agent was not justiﬁed in believing
(and hence asserting) that p.5 What is more, to decide which account
best captures the norm of assertion, it makes good sense to let perceived
assertability, knowledge, truth and justiﬁcation vary independently.
The following experiments address the two worries empirically.
3. Experiment 1
3.1. Participants, materials and procedure
380 participants located in the US were recruited on Amazon
Mechanical Turk to complete an online questionnaire. Non-native
speakers, subjects failing an attention test and those responding in
under 10 seconds were excluded. 337 participants remained (150 fe-
male, age M=36 years, SD=12 years).
The vignette was based on Russell’s (1948/2013) Clock Case, an
early precursor to Gettier’s (1963) examples. It came in three condi-
tions: an uncontroversial case of knowledge (K), a case of justiﬁed, yet
accidentally true belief (TJB) and a case of false belief (FB). The three
scenarios were identical except for the ﬁnal sentences (the letters in
bold were omitted in the vignettes):
June is at the station, talking to her friend Joe on the phone. At some
stage, Joe asks her what time it is, since he wants to go for a run
before it gets dark. June looks at the platform clock, which says it's
5.30 h. So she concludes it's 5.30 h.
K The clock shows the correct time, since it has just been controlled
that very morning.
TJB Unbeknownst to June, the clock does not work. It has shown the
same time for weeks. However, it so happens that it is in fact exactly
5.30 h when Joe asks for the time.
FB Unbeknownst to June, the clock does not work. It has shown the
same time for weeks. The actual time is 4.18 h.
Participants were asked forced-choice yes/no questions about
whether they consider p assertable, whether p is true, and whether June
knows that p (in that order), where p stands for ‘it is 5.30 h’. The as-
sertability question came in three versions, asking whether participants
thought June ‘should say’ that p, that June ‘is permitted to say’ that p
and whether it is ‘appropriate for June to say’ that p (see Appendix for
details). There were thus nine conditions in total (3 scenarios× 3 for-
mulations). Each participant was randomly assigned to one of them.
3.2. Results
3.2.1. Assertability results across formulations
Fig. 1 shows the results for the assertability question across for-
mulations and scenarios. While the impact of formulation on
4 Turri himself highlights this point (2013: 281) and explicitly encourages experiments
with alternative framings.
5 Note that formulating the norm of assertion in terms of what should be said, rather
than what it is appropriate or permitted to say, might considerably aggravate the problem.
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assertability was not signiﬁcant in scenarios K (χ2(2)= 1.92, p= .384,
ϕ= .132) and TJB (χ2(2)= .23, p= .891, ϕ= .045), it was borderline
signiﬁcant for the FB condition (χ2(2)= 5.39, p= .051, ϕ= .228). The
diﬀerence is driven by the ‘should’ formulation, for which assertability
ascriptions are signiﬁcantly lower than for the ‘permitted’ formulation
(χ2(1)= 4.59, p= .032, ϕ= .246) and near-signiﬁcantly lower than
for the ‘appropriate’ formulation (χ2(1)= 3.64, p= .056, ϕ= .225).
Since the assertability results for the ‘appropriate’ and ‘permitted’ for-
mulations did not diﬀer signiﬁcantly (χ2(1)= .035, p= .851,
ϕ= .021), the data-sets were combined to increase power. The main
analyses regarding the norm of assertion were thus conducted for as-
sertability in the ‘should’ formulation on the one hand, and the ‘ap-
propriate’/’permitted’ formulations on the other.
3.2.2. General results for ‘should’
The results for assertability (in the ‘should’ formulation), knowledge
and truth are presented in Fig. 2. Knowledge quite clearly doesn’t
constitute the norm of assertion: While a mere 38% considered p known
in the TJB condition, a signiﬁcantly higher proportion, 95%, thought p
should be asserted (McNemar test, p < .001). In the FB condition, only
21% considered p known, though 65% thought p should nonetheless be
asserted (the diﬀerence is signiﬁcant, McNemar test, p < .001).6 The
truth account does little better: Although only 3% considered p true in
the FB condition, 65% stated that it should be asserted (the diﬀerence is
signiﬁcant, McNemar test, p < .001).
3.2.3. General results for ‘appropriate’ and ‘permitted’
The results for assertability (in the ‘appropriate’ and ‘permitted’
formulations), knowledge and truth are presented in Fig. 3. The
knowledge account once again fares poorly: Only 34% judged p known
in the TJB condition, yet a signiﬁcantly higher proportion, 93%, con-
sidered p assertable (McNemar test, p < .001). In the FB condition, a
mere 24% judged p known, though 85% stated that p is assertable (the
diﬀerence is signiﬁcant, McNemar test, p < .001). The norm of asser-
tion isn’t factive either: Only 1% of the participants considered p true in
the FB condition, yet 85% held that it is nonetheless assertable (the
diﬀerence is signiﬁcant, McNemar test, p < .001).
3.3. Discussion
Experiment 1 produced two ﬁndings: First, judgments of assert-
ability depend on the normative force employed in the assertability
question. Responses to the question whether p should be asserted are
more sensitive to the truth or falsity of p than responses to the question
whether it is appropriate or permitted to assert that p. Second, for all
three formulations, the ratio of participants who deem p assertable is
high under conditions in which the majority withholds the ascription of
knowledge (as in the TJB and FB scenarios) or truth (as in the FB sce-
nario). The results are inconsistent with the knowledge and truth ac-
counts of the norm of assertion. Experiment 2 attempts to replicate the
ﬁndings with a diﬀerent scenario and controls for a further potential
norm of assertion: justiﬁed belief.
4. Experiment 2
4.1. Participants, materials and procedure
403 participants located in the US were recruited on Amazon
Mechanical Turk to complete an online questionnaire. Non-native
speakers, subjects failing an attention test and those responding in
under 10 seconds were excluded. 350 participants remained (151 fe-
male, age M=37 years, SD=11 years).
Participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions of
the well-worn American Car vignette (Nichols, Stich, & Weinberg,
2003), in which Bob’s friend Jill has driven a Buick (an American car)
for years. In the knowledge condition K, Jill still drives a Buick. In the
Gettier condition TJB, Jill has replaced it with a Pontiac (also an
American car), of which Bob is unaware. In the false belief condition
FB, Jill now drives – unbeknownst to Bob – a Mercedes (a German car).
Bob’s wife wants to know what kind of car Jill drives. Participants were
asked forced-choice yes/no questions about whether p is assertable,
whether Bob really knows that p, whether p is true and whether Bob is
justiﬁed in believing that p (in that order), where p stands for ‘Jill drives
an American car’ (the vignette and questions can be found in the
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
K TJB FB
Permitted Appropriate Should
Fig. 1. Judgments of assertability across formulations and scenarios.
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
K TJB FB
Assertable True Known
Fig. 2. Judgements of assertability (for the ‘should assert that p’ formulation),
knowledge and truth across scenarios.
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
K TJB FB
Assertable Known True
Fig. 3. Judgements of assertability (for the ‘appropriate/permitted to assert
that p’ formulations), knowledge and truth across scenarios.
6 Further analyses can be conducted on the basis of the proportions of participants who
consider p (i) assertable and known, (ii) assertable and not known, (iii) not assertable
though known and (iv) neither assertable nor known; the same holds for the data re-
garding assertability and truth. The results (see Appendix) are consistent with the ones
reported in the main text.
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Appendix). As in the previous experiment, the formulation of the as-
sertability question varied. Participants were randomly assigned either
to the question whether ‘Bob should assert that p’ or whether it ‘would
be appropriate for Bob to assert that p’. (Since the data for ‘appropriate’
and ‘permissible’ was near-identical in Experiment 1, only the former
formulation was used.)
4.2. Results and discussion
Pearson’s Chi Square tests for assertability ascription revealed a
signiﬁcant eﬀect of scenario (χ2(2)= 42.73, p < .001, ϕ= .349) and a
signiﬁcant eﬀect of the formulation of the assertability question
(χ2(1)= 5.50, p= .019, ϕ= .125), cf. the ﬁrst two bars for each sce-
nario in Fig. 4. Formulation did not prove signiﬁcant in scenarios K
(χ2(1)= 2.10, p= .147, ϕ= .132) and TJB (χ2(1)= .001, p= .969,
ϕ= .004). In the FB scenario, by contrast, the ratio of participants who
judged it appropriate to assert that p signiﬁcantly exceeded the ratio of
participants who judged that p should be asserted (χ2(1)= 10.46,
p= .001, ϕ= .296). The results once again demonstrate that the for-
mulation of the assertability question can make a diﬀerence.
Replicating the ﬁndings of Experiment 1, the data challenges the
knowledge account for both formulations of the assertability question.
Consistent with philosophical theorizing about Gettier cases, the ma-
jority did not ascribe knowledge in the TJB condition, only 32% did.
However, 97% considered it nonetheless appropriate to assert p and
100% thought that p should be asserted. In either formulation, assert-
ability signiﬁcantly exceeded knowledge ascriptions (McNemar tests,
ps < .001). In the FB condition, a mere 14% judged p known, though
90% considered it nonetheless appropriate to assert p, and 65% held
that p should be asserted. Assertability again signiﬁcantly exceeds
knowledge ascriptions in either formulation (McNemar tests, ps <
.001).
Consistent with the ﬁndings of Experiment 1, there’s also pressure
on the factivity of the norm of assertion. In the FB condition, only 3% of
the participants considered p true, though 90% judged it appropriate to
assert p and 65% thought p should be asserted. For both formulations,
assertability signiﬁcantly exceeds truth ascriptions (McNemar tests,
ps < .001).
Is justiﬁcation the norm of assertion? The results look encouraging.
Justiﬁcation, just like assertability (on either formulation), signiﬁcantly
exceeded chance in all three scenarios (binomial tests, all ps < .001).
In the ‘appropriate’ formulation, no diﬀerence between assertability
and justiﬁcation could be detected in any of the three scenarios
(McNemar tests, all ps > .125). For the ‘should’ formulation, assert-
ability and justiﬁcation only diﬀered signiﬁcantly for the FB scenario
(McNemar test, p < .001).
The core ﬁndings of Experiment 1 were replicated: Formulation
matters, and both knowledge and truth seem unlikely candidates for the
norm of assertion.7 Justiﬁcation, by contrast, seems promising: For the
‘appropriate’ formulation, no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between assert-
ability and justiﬁcation could be detected for any condition. In the
‘should’ formulation, justiﬁcation exceeds assertability in the FB sce-
nario, but still does considerably better as a predictor than knowledge
or truth overall. To get clearer on justiﬁcation as a potential norm of
assertion, a more ﬁne-grained experimental approach might be helpful,
to which we turn in the next section.
5. Experiment 3
The ﬁrst two experiments used a forced-choice response me-
chanism. In order to explore whether the results prove robust across
diﬀerent experimental methodologies, and to run a mediation analysis
so as to further explore justiﬁcation, a Likert scale design was used for
Experiment 3.
5.1. Participants, materials and procedure
363 participants located in the US were recruited on Amazon
Mechanical Turk to complete an online questionnaire. Non-native
speakers, subjects failing an attention test and those responding in
under 20 seconds were excluded. 297 participants remained (129 fe-
male, age M=36 years, SD=12 years).
The vignette (cf. Appendix) was based on a scenario by Starmans
and Friedman (2012): Julie buys yoghurt at the deli. Later that day, her
husband asks whether there is yoghurt in the fridge. In the false belief
condition FB, Julie has in fact bought sour cream due to inattentiveness;
in the knowledge condition K, she has bought yoghurt and her belief
appropriately tracks the truth. The Gettier condition came in two var-
iations: (a) Unbeknownst to Julie, her neighbor breaks into her house
and replaces her yoghurt with his yoghurt (the ‘authentic evidence’ case
TJBAut); (b) there was a mix-up at the factory, and the container Julie
bought actually contains sour cream. But, unbeknownst to Julie, her
neighbor sneaks into her house and replaces her container with another
one ﬁlled with yoghurt (the ‘apparent evidence’ case, TJBApp).
The experiment took a 2 (formulation of assertability question:
‘should’ v. ‘appropriate’) x 4 (scenario: K v. TJBAut v. TJBApp v. FB)
between-subjects design. Participants were randomly assigned to one of
the eight conditions. They were asked to assess the following claims on
a 7-point Likert scale ranging from (1) ‘completely disagree’ to (7)
‘completely agree’: (ia) ‘It is appropriate for Julie to say that p’, or else
(ib) ‘Julie should say that p’, (ii) ‘Julie really knows that p’, (iii) ‘It is
true that p’ and (iv) ‘Julie is justiﬁed in believing that p’, where p stands
for ‘there is yoghurt in the fridge’. A ﬁnal question (v) was added, which
asked whether ‘Julie could be reproached for saying that p’ in order to
explore whether a more general standard response to norm-violation –
reproach – might correlate with assertability.
5.2. Results and discussion
5.2.1. General results
A 2 (formulation of assertability question: ‘should’ v. ‘appro-
priate’)× 4 (scenario: K v. TJBAut v. TJBApp v. FB) ANOVA exploring
the impact of formulation and scenario on judgments of assertability
revealed a signiﬁcant main eﬀect of scenario (F(3,289)= 5.31,
p= .001, ηp2= .052), no signiﬁcant main eﬀect of formulation (F
(1,289)= .188, p= .721, ηp2= .000), and no signiﬁcant interaction (F
(3,289)= 2.04, p= .108, ηp2= .021). Bonferroni corrected post-hoc
tests revealed that assertability in the FB scenario diﬀered signiﬁcantly
from each of the three other scenarios (all ps < .007). No signiﬁcant
diﬀerence in assertability could be detected across the K, TJBAut and
TJBApp scenarios. For either formulation, mean assertability ratings in
0%
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80%
100%
K TJB FB
Assertable (appropriate) Assertable (should) Known True Justified
Fig. 4. Proportions of subjects who considered p assertable, known, true and
justiﬁed across scenarios.
7 Importantly, there seems to be convergence on these ﬁndings: In experiments similar
in spirit, Reuter and Broessel (in press) as well as Marsili and Wiegmann (in preparation)
obtain results consistent with the ones here reported.
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all four scenarios signiﬁcantly exceeded the midpoint (one sample t-
tests, all ps < .001), suggesting that assertability is deemed appro-
priate even in conditions in which the agent does not have knowledge
of p, and when p is false.
Expectedly, ascription of the potential predictors diﬀered sig-
niﬁcantly across type (knowledge, truth, justiﬁcation and absence of
reproach), and mean levels of each of the potential predictors diﬀered
signiﬁcantly across scenario (for detailed statistics, see Section 4.1 of
the Appendix).
Since no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in assertability ascriptions could be
detected across formulation (‘should’ v. ‘appropriate’), the data-sets
were combined. The mean levels of ascriptions of assertability and the
four potential predictors are graphically represented in Fig. 5. Mean
assertability levels signiﬁcantly exceeded mean knowledge levels in the
TJBAut, TJBApp and the FB scenarios (for the statistics, cf. Tables 5–8 in
Section 4.2 of the Appendix), which casts further doubt on the knowl-
edge account. Mean assertability levels also signiﬁcantly exceeded
mean truth levels in the TJBApp and FB scenarios, challenging the fac-
tivity of the norm of assertion. Absence of reproach, too, is a poor
predictor, since it diﬀered signiﬁcantly from assertability in the K and
FB scenarios. By contrast, and supporting the ﬁndings from Experiment
2, no signiﬁcant diﬀerence could be detected between the mean levels
of assertability and justiﬁcation for any of the four scenarios.
5.2.2. Mediation analysis
A multicategorical multiple mediation analysis with 5000 bias-
corrected bootstrap samples was conducted using Hayes’ PROCESS
macro for SPSS (model 4, Hayes, 2017). Given that the ﬁxed factor,
scenario, had four levels, three dummy-coded variables were created
(cf. Hayes & Preacher, 2014) with scenario FB as the reference group.8
Each dummy-coded variable corresponds to one of the three possible
contrasts: D1 explores the contrast for scenarios TJBApp and FB, D2 for
scenarios TJBAut and FB, and D3 for scenarios K and FB.
The results are summarized in Fig. 6. Justiﬁcation was the only
signiﬁcant mediator, with an indirect omnibus eﬀect of scenario on
assertability Io= .05, [.01; .12]. While an omnibus test for D1-D3 re-
veals a signiﬁcant total eﬀect of scenario on assertability (the c path in
brackets), the eﬀect is no longer signiﬁcant once justiﬁcation is con-
trolled for as a mediator (the c′ path). For each potential mediator, the
indirect omnibus eﬀects of scenario on assertability Io are stated with
95% conﬁdence intervals. The indirect individual eﬀects of scenario on
assertability through justiﬁcation were signiﬁcant for D1 (ID1 = .55,
[.22; .97]), D2 (ID2= .43, [.07; .88]), and D3 (ID3= .63, [.01; .12]).
Fig. 6 details the eﬀects of scenario on each of the four potential
mediators calculated on the basis of D1-D3 in terms of R2. The in-
dividual regression coeﬃcients for each of the dummy variables and
each of the potential mediators, i.e. the 12 individual a paths, can be
found in the Appendix (all 12 a paths were signiﬁcant, all ps < .003).
Consistent with the ﬁndings of Experiments 1 and 2, knowledge and
truth once again prove inadequate predictors of assertability, and re-
proach does little better. The justiﬁed belief account, by contrast, holds
considerable promise. Our results so far, however, can only establish
1.00
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4.00
5.00
6.00
7.00
K TJBAut TJBApp FB
Assertable Known True Justified Not reproachable
Fig. 5. Mean ratings for assertability, knowledge, truth, justiﬁcation and absence of reproach across the four scenarios. Error bars denote standard error of the mean.
Fig. 6. Multicategorical Mediation Analysis with 5000 bootstrap samples.
8 Nothing hangs on this choice, no matter which scenario is chosen as the reference
group, the a paths come out signiﬁcant for all four potential mediators.
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that justiﬁed belief is a suﬃcient condition for assertability. It might still
turn out that justiﬁed belief is not in fact necessary, and that assertion is
governed by an even weaker norm, for instance a norm tied to belief
simpliciter. A ﬁnal experiment was conducted to resolve this remaining
question.
6. Experiment 4
Experiment 4 focuses on the two weakest norms discussed in the
introduction: It explores whether assertability depends on justiﬁed be-
lief or belief simpliciter. To do so, a vignette was devised in which the
agent asserts that p in the belief that p, while its evidential support
varies across conditions.
6.1. Participants, materials and procedure
162 participants located in the US were recruited on Amazon
Mechanical Turk to complete an online questionnaire. Non-native
speakers, subjects failing an attention test or a comprehension check
were excluded. 149 participants remained (84 female, age
M=35 years, SD=10 years).
The vignette came in two variations, one in which the agent has
good evidence for his belief and asserts that p, and one in which his
evidence for p is poor. The prompt read (variations in square brackets):
Carlos is at the JFK airport in New York, waiting for his ﬂight to
Amsterdam. An elderly woman asks him whether he could tell her at
which gate the ﬂight to Paris departs. Carlos has a look at the
monitor listing the departure gates. [The departure list states that
the only ﬂight to Paris leaves at gate 24./He cannot ﬁnd the ﬂight to
Paris in the list. But Carlos has a hunch that it might depart from
gate 24, and thus comes to believe that it will.] Carlos says to the
elderly woman: “The ﬂight to Paris leaves at gate 24.”
Participants were presented with forced-choice yes/no questions
about (i) the assertability of Carlos’s claim that p, (ii) whether his belief
that p was justiﬁed, and (iii) whether he in fact believed that p, where p
stands for “the ﬂight to Paris leaves at gate 24” (the order was rando-
mized, cf. Section 5 of the Appendix for the exact formulations). As in
the previous experiments, the assertability question came in two ver-
sions. One question asked whether Carlos ‘should have said’ that p, the
other asked whether ‘it was appropriate for Carlos to say’ that p. There
were thus four conditions in total (2 types of evidence× 2 formulations
of the assertability question); each participant was randomly assigned
to one of them. The three target questions were followed by a com-
prehension question.
6.2. Results and discussion
Pearson’s Chi Square tests for assertability ascription revealed a
signiﬁcant eﬀect of scenario (χ2(1)= 89.58, p < .001, ϕ= .775), yet
no signiﬁcant eﬀect of the formulation of the assertability question
(χ2(1)= .01, p= .940, ϕ= .006). Since the impact of formulation on
assertability responses also proved insigniﬁcant for each scenario in-
dividually (poor evidence: χ2(1)= 3.03, p= .082, ϕ= .201; good
evidence: χ2(1)= 2.30, p= .129, ϕ= .176), the datasets were com-
bined for increased power. Fig. 7 graphically represents the proportions
of participants who considered p assertable, justiﬁed, and who held that
Carlos believed that p.
In the good evidence scenario, 95% deemed Carlos’s belief that p
justiﬁed and 93% considered p assertable (both signiﬁcantly exceeding
chance, binomial tests, ps < .001). In the poor evidence scenario, 20%
deemed p justiﬁed and 16% considered p assertable (both signiﬁcantly
below chance, binomial tests, ps < .001). For either scenario, the
proportions of people who considered p justiﬁed and those who con-
sidered p assertable did not diﬀer signiﬁcantly (McNemar tests, ps >
.507).
To rule out that the diﬀerence in assertability judgments is driven
by the perceived absence of belief simpliciter, rather than its justiﬁca-
tion, participants were also asked whether Carlos in fact believed that p.
In either scenario, the vast majority did ascribe the belief that p to
Carlos (signiﬁcantly exceeding chance, binomial tests, ps < .001).
Whereas 85% of the participants responded that Carlos believed that p
in the poor evidence condition, only 20% considered his belief justiﬁed
(the diﬀerence is signiﬁcant, McNemar test, p < .001). The low as-
sertability rating in the poor evidence scenario must thus be principally
due to the absence of justiﬁcation, not the absence of brute belief.
Diﬀerently put, belief, by itself, does not constitute the norm of asser-
tion. Though 85% of the participants ascribe the belief that p to Carlos,
only 16% consider Carlos’s claim that p assertable (the diﬀerence is
signiﬁcant, McNemar test, p < .001).
7. General discussion
In a series of four experiments using distinct methodologies and
scenarios, we have explored the nature of the norm of assertion, and
aspects pertaining to its normative force. As concerns the former, for a
speaker to assert that p, it is not necessary that she know that p, or that p
be true. By itself, the belief that p, however, provides insuﬃcient war-
rant to assert that p. Instead, the data suggests that a speaker should
assert that p, or that it is appropriate for her to do so, only when she is
justiﬁed in believing that p. While the negative results are rather con-
clusive, the positive ﬁndings must still be treated with caution: More
empirical work is needed to establish whether justiﬁed belief constrains
assertion across a wide range of contexts, and whether there is indeed
but a single norm of assertion.
As concerns normative force: The assertability data of some of the
experiments suggests that the framing of the norm of assertion merits
further attention. In certain conditions, intuitions as to whether p should
be asserted and whether it is permissible or appropriate to do so diﬀer
signiﬁcantly. Future theoretical and experimental work on assertion
should explore whether the stringent conception of the norm (invoking
what should be asserted, which dominates the empirical literature) is
adequate, or whether a more lenient conception of the norm is pre-
ferable.
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